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
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Foerster - A voice from Germany



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A VOICE FROM GERMANY:

Why German Peace Declarations Fail to Convince

By Professor F. W. FOERSTER

AUSTRIA'S PEACE PROPOSALS

The Letter to Prince Sixtus



AUGUST, 1918

No. 129

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION
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It is the aim of the Association for International Conciliation to awaken interest and to seek coöperation in the movement to promote international good will. This movement depends for its ultimate success upon increased international understanding, appreciation, and sympathy. To this end, documents are printed and widely circulated, giving information as to the progress of the movement and as to matters connected therewith, in order that individual citizens, the newspaper press, and organizations of various kinds may have accurate information on these subjects readily available.

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Subscription rate: twenty-five cents for one year, or one dollar for five years.

Professor F. W. Foerster of Munich, a son of the eminent professor of astronomy at Berlin, has been the object of vehement attacks in Germany, including an open attack in the Bavarian Landtag. The following is a translation of the complete text of an article by him which appeared in the *Münchener Post* of January 4, 1918.

A VOICE FROM GERMANY

Why German Peace Declarations Fail to Convince

By Professor F. W. FOERSTER

I

At this time when our enemies, in spite of their great longing for peace, are apparently determined with increasing unanimity to continue the war, it is well for us to look about us and ask what obstacles we offer from our side to the conclusion of peace, instead of trying to throw all the blame for the continuance of this wholesale murder upon our opponents.

It is true that the war fanatics in the ranks of our enemies follow a false idea and fall into the very idolatry of force against which they are fighting. The more one trusts to war the more power it wins over his soul. The nations of the Entente will also be scourged by this universal day of judgment into the recognition that this world conflict cannot be decided

or stopped by force, nor until they take another tone with which to address the German people than that which they have used before and during this war. For our own national self-knowledge, however, it would be highly profitable if we would ask ourselves seriously how it happens that all these peoples on the one hand long so passionately for an enduring peace and yet on the other hand reject just as passionately all negotiations with the present representatives of German authority and of the German spirit.

Why are England and America determined not to lay down their arms until they have broken the power of Germany? A reply which is as cheap as it is superficial is current, namely, that nothing but the most ordinary policy of self-interest is behind this determination. England wishes to rid herself of our competition and to take over our colonies; America wishes to make sure of the interest upon her investments, and so forth. As to England's jealousy of our competition, this is merely a fairy tale invented in the interest of the war. The real England—upon whom, rather than upon the snap judgments of shortsighted individuals, the whole matter depends—knows perfectly well that there has come to her in the last fifteen years of this steadily growing competition, an unexampled increase of her own economic prosperity. Why? Because Germany's success in export trade caused a rapidly increasing demand in the German market for English products. Hence the collapse of the protectionist movement in England, the best proof of the fact that German competition was by no means regarded as a negative economic factor. England as the greatest expert in the subject of economic interdependence could not hide the fact that there is in the

world not only room enough for both powers, but that the work in the world of the one opens up almost inexhaustible opportunities for the work in the world of the other. The talk about England's jealousy of our competition being the determinative factor in the outbreak of the war and its continuance, betrays a very primitive conception of economic conditions. The same may be said of the assertion that England is continuing the war in order to retain our colonies. Shortly before the war England met us more than half way in the matter of our colonial possessions because, as Dr. Solf said only recently, a wider extension of the British possessions would have overtaxed England's powers and her responsibilities for imperial organization.

As to America, the statement that the war is supported there only because of money interests also rests upon a very primitive conception of economic conditions. Not that money interests may not be a very strong motive over there, but America, months ago, would have satisfied these money interests infinitely more surely and profitably if she had come to a speedy conclusion of peace and had re-established business relations with Europe which is in direct need of raw material, than by continuing the war, which even if it is finally won by America will leave a bankrupt Europe with long outstanding debts and a greatly reduced market.

II

Why then do England and America continue this war? They are in this war to abolish war and the threat of war. That seems to many of the young Germans, brought up in the glamor of war, to be

going a little too far. But they do not realize how great a hold the pacifist ideal had taken upon the Anglo-American world in the last twenty-years, not only for idealistic reasons but, as Herbert Spencer emphasized so often, because well established methods of mediation for the settlement of international disputes are indispensable for the preservation of the highly-developed organization of great world-interests. Just because we do not grasp this fact, but insist that the determination of our enemies is based upon a hand-to-mouth, living-by-the-day policy of self-interest, we allow ourselves to be persuaded by would-be clever people that America is arming herself so effectively not against us but against Japan. That is a 'Prussian' psychology. Of course America fears the world policy of Japan, but just because she wishes to avoid at any price the transforming of the new world into a training camp on account of Japan, she is determined to win over Japan and render her inoffensive by pacific means, that is to say through membership in a society of nations. Behind the program of world peace in the message of President Wilson of January 22, 1917, will be found three motives: first, the democratic, ethical idealism of the descendants of the Puritans and Quakers and all that element which because of one or another form of oppression has sought refuge from Europe; second, economic, a technical Americanism which sees in war an outgrown method of adjusting international relations, paralyzing every hope of far-reaching world-wide achievement; and third, the danger of complications with Japan. Only he who clearly understands with what fervor of deeply aroused public sentiment these idealistic and realistic motives drive

America at any cost to place the interrelations of nations upon an entirely new foundation of justice—only he is proof against the absurd editorials with which today the greater part even of the conciliatory German press comments upon President Wilson's policies.

Is it necessary, however, that America should continue the war to establish her program of world policy? Did not the majority resolution of the German Reichstag, as well as the answer of the Central Powers to the Pope's Note, express unequivocally our readiness to coöperate in the realization of such plans for the future? What more could be asked? The answer is very simple: the Entente find no convincing moral guarantee behind all these declarations. They will not believe that that 'majority' is firmly in power. They can unfortunately point to far too many insolent protests from the most influential circles against that resolution. These protests indicate the characteristic position of the would-be intellectual leaders of the nation. The Entente follow with interest the heathenish editorials of the Christian *Kölnische Volkszeitung* which recommends to a great and growing people a Machiavellian policy. It brings hosts of witnesses to prove that academic circles in Germany still hold the point of view that the military authorities should dominate, based upon a policy of force in dealing with international problems. Indeed it suspects that many of those who supported the resolution in the summer of 1917 were influenced not by any fundamental change in their views upon international policies, but by the suspension of military operations. The convictions of such people are often altered by a change in the war situation.

The future society of nations cannot be founded, however, upon such an unreliable public sentiment. The Entente say as to this: A superstition, nourished by the whole of Prussian history, that the safety of the nation is secured only by force of arms has, through its gigantic successes, eaten into the very souls of the Germans; a romantic belief in the power of the rattling of the sword has grown up which can only be destroyed by the bitter experience of a complete break-down of the German position. The deep suspicion that lurks in this conception has unfortunately been strengthened by Czernin's notion of setting a time-limit upon his impressive confession in favor of peace without annexation. As though a time-limit can be put upon convictions regarding the only possible basis of a future society of nations! I am convinced that the nations cannot economically, financially or morally continue a further competition in armaments; therefore I must oppose all violence—that is to say, every attempt to continue hate and distrust, no matter how far behind my point of view others may lag—or I shall arouse the suspicion that I have no convictions and am only playing a skillful game. Such suspicion makes trust impossible.

It is inconceivable that so large a proportion of the German people should talk continually about the enemy's determination to go on with the war and the Germans' wish for peace, without asking themselves if that determination to continue the war does not arise from the fact that our offers of peace are made worthless by the military pride and the spirit of conquest which dominate our interviews and speeches, thereby exciting a hostile self-consciousness on the part of our enemies. Also the tradition of national

selfishness and reliance upon force is too strong to win confidence abroad in a new Germany. When one compares the pacifist literature appearing in England from the pen of noted men of letters (Hobson, Russell, Dickinson, Brailsford) and the corresponding utterances of eminent public men (Lord Buckmaster, Lord Bryce, Lord Courtney, Lord Lansdowne) with what we are permitted to say, one realizes that among us the pacifist literature has been for the most part suppressed; so that it is no wonder our enemies are not yet especially impressed with the power, the authority and the spiritual depth of our desire for peace. A nation's genuine desire for peace must manifest itself more concretely than in general and ambiguous declarations.

The deathlike silence which is forced upon the German people, and indeed upon German statesmen also, by a secret superior power, with regard to the most burning questions concerning the great European catastrophe, does not bring us confidence from abroad. In his open letter to Herr von Kühlmann (printed in the *Manchester Guardian*) Lord Courtney says that the declaration for a future peaceful settlement of international disputes by arbitration will be believed in when the questions in dispute at this very moment are discussed in a really conciliatory spirit. It is just this which is found wanting in us, as for example our treatment of the Alsace-Lorraine question. Lord Courtney has certainly found the weak spot in our protestations concerning peace. Even if we should refuse to give back the tiniest strip of territory, we are bound, if we persist in such an attitude, to take all the more care to meet half-way the demands of others for justice. Either a conciliatory peace is an

empty phrase, merely an attempt to make a mechanical compromise which leaves all the inflammable material ready to ignite again and does not signify in any way a new ordering of international life, or it means a real spiritual and moral unity and reconciliation by means of a general acceptance of certain vital principles which should be our guide in the solution of mutual demands and in present and future conflict of interests. If this is the definition of a conciliatory peace, then it is our duty to try to understand the point of view of our opponents, that is to say the basis which is considered abroad as indispensable, legally and morally, to a lasting peace.

The plain, bald statement, however, that Alsace-Lorraine is a German question does not help in the least toward the settlement of the world crisis, for however German the Alsace-Lorraine question may be it is at the same time a European question. The taking away of the rights of the Alsatians separated us from the democratic sentiment of the rest of the world and will continue to separate us if we do not, through the solution of the Alsace-Lorraine question, deliberately recognize a principle which alone will win for us faith in our desire for justice. According to their principle of self-determination the Entente regards an adjustment of that question as a 'symbol of the victory of justice'. They say: Yes, certainly Alsace-Lorraine comes of German stock; but the cultural bond is still closer. Under the French régime of liberty and respect for traditions, through the experience of the French Revolution and, especially through the ideas which sprang from it, and finally through the events of the Napoleonic era, the population of Alsace-Lorraine has been in fact deeply estranged

from Germany. The Prussian administration has roused in the soul of the Alsatians a feeling of outrage. A democratic age demands full expiation for this. The *Manchester Guardian* for October 13, 1917 makes the following summary of the English point of view:

If a world war cannot reverse such a wrong (forceful annexation) may it not be argued in the future that there exists nowhere in the world any ultimate reserve force to which the wronged can appeal. The Germans may and probably do say that our own country was not less guilty of annexing a white population in South Africa, but our country saw its error and reversed it, placing the disposal of South Africa in the hands of the South Africans themselves. Had Germany so acted with Alsace-Lorraine there would from that day have been a different Europe and there would have been no world war.

There are but two possible courses for the German people with regard to these moral and political demands: either we entirely refuse, in a sort of fit of national arrogance, to discuss the matter from this point of view at all and so isolate ourselves from certain principles which are today moving the entire world, although agreement upon these principles may be of the greatest importance for the new foundation of our influence in the world; or we admit that for the restoration of our over-seas position the most important thing of all is full reconciliation with the west and agreement to the demands coming from the west for moral guarantees of a durable peace, especially if mere sentiment is set aside and the matter viewed as *Realpolitik*. When the doctrine of self-determination is viewed in this reasonable light, that is to say not as a principle of dissolution but as a protest against merely mechanical unity, one must not only accept it, but be willing to make sacrifices for it, without the

un-German and narrow-minded fear that our frontiers would thereby be made unsafe. The moral unity of Europe is from now on to be the only reliable protection for frontiers.

It all comes down to this, that the German people must finally understand in what sense the Alsace-Lorraine problem is a European problem. That province should be raised immediately to a position of full legislative rights in equality with the other states. And this should be done solemnly and deliberately in the determination to accept the principles of a new international law which are now moving the rest of the world. If this had been done in December, 1916, it would have been a far more effective offer of peace than all general declarations.

III

In dealing with the Belgian question too, our representative men must make specific statements and not indulge in ambiguous generalities before they can dare, before the judgment seat of exact truth, to talk about the hand which had been extended for peace being rudely rejected. All turns upon the conciliatory spirit, upon the triumph of sound words over all pretense, and not upon pacific formulas. Only when the restoration of Belgium is looked upon as a question of national honor and not as a matter of business, only when we take back the word of the Chancellor as to a committed wrong, only when the sense of right of the German people becomes so strong that it breaks through all pretenses and sees how inadequate are the so-called proofs with which certain teachers of international law have brought suspicion upon the Belgian

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government and talked us out of any thought of wrong on our part—only then shall we reach the right conclusions and find the right words to convince the rest of the world that a new Germany has come into existence. After it was stated in the summer of 1917 by German military experts that the whole plan of the French campaign and strategy prove, that the violation of Belgian neutrality did not enter into the plans, all other assertions of a Belgian conspiracy against us have become worthless, quite apart from the fact that all the much quoted conversations dealt not with the making of war but only with defense against German invasion. The foundation for an objective and just examination of the Belgian question has therefore been laid. The determination to carry out such an examination will be far more weighty for the conclusion of peace than ten offers of peace. It is also of vital importance for the respect for law and conscience on the part of the whole German people. It is a national question of the first importance.

Peace depends, however, not only upon us but upon the attitude taken by Austria-Hungary. Has Austria-Hungary comprehended the necessity for an agreement with our opponents on matters of principle, from which all other agreements follow as a matter of course? It is at once evident that a political authority which rests upon the federal union of widely differing nationalities, cannot settle questions by the mere catchword 'self-determination'. There is in this struggle for freedom an anarchistic, destructive tendency which leads every baker's shop to declare itself autonomous. But just because the catchword is rejected, there is all the more obligation to promise radical changes, guided by entirely new principles, in

certain governmental and administrative methods which contributed largely to the outbreak of the world-conflagration. For example, the Austro-Italians, and particularly the Dalmatian populations, should have been promised after the war the greatest possible independence in dealing with questions of taxes, customs, and so forth, and full consent to their autonomy in all matters of education and religion. In such ways this whole world-uprising might have been checked effectively. The fact that, instead of this, the official attitude has been limited to mere insistence on the rights of possession, marks a failure in world policy which must make the impression upon the rest of the world that we have not yet comprehended that the hour for the world-wide application of these policies has struck, and that it is idle to enter into peace negotiations with a people so far removed in all that concerns these vitally important principles. In truth, there grips the people of the Central Powers like a curse a one-sided, political tradition of centralization which holds them imprisoned by the fear of liberty and withholds from them the truth that 'nothing binds so fast as liberty'.

In the *Tägliche Rundschau* during last summer there appeared the following noteworthy paragraph: "Why do we refuse to heed the mighty warning of Russia? Why does not Germany take the lead in this spiritual elevation of the whole conception of war, in this bringing of an august, divine thought to truth from the material chaos? Have we not the youth and the spirit for it?" And in the same sense M. Rade says in the *Christliche Welt*: "Ideas must be the future guardians of peace. They must not only be present but they must be apparent to the world, to all man-

kind. This metaphysical, meta-military side of the question we Germans have disregarded too long. Yes, we ourselves! The time will come when we shall not be able to understand how this could have happened."

IV

Here is the gist of the present crying need of the world. Each people has a part to play in the world civilization according to its special and deepest gifts. If it fails to fulfil its mission then the equilibrium is destroyed. "Great Caesar fell—and when he fell, then you and I and all of us fell down!" We once formed the "innermost centre of international life". We produced the ideas by which the feeling of unity of the civilized world was continually strengthened. For scores of years our part has been reversed. We have become the prophets of national isolation. The declarations of our statesmen regarding ideas of international unity limp always far behind those of others. The poverty of ideas in our policies is actually shocking. Can the world be healed in that way? No, we have much to make good to the world and to ourselves. And the moment is now here. Never was there a time in history when more fruitful opportunities and tasks demanding statesmanship of the highest order were offered to a people than in the present world crisis. The whole enemy world longs for peace and yet at the same time it longs for war because it believes that the mental attitude of an all too large and too influential group among us gives no moral guarantee for a durable peace. We can never refute this world judgment either by arms or through general statements. But we can establish our moral

standing in the world in an entirely new sense if we now become the spokesmen of a new European order and follow a creative policy instead of one of mere possession, not with words and empty self-praise but with practical proposals in which a noble tact will be convincingly displayed, working for the interests of all and for genuine compensation over the entire field of the conflict. We must have the courage to place ourselves and our affairs confidently under the protection of a new international justice, under a genuine world policy instead of an egotistical policy; that is to say, we must interest ourselves in the opportunities of all peoples who share this world agony, drawing upon the wisdom of the entire world to teach us the spirit of justice and upon the wide outlook of a people that trades abroad. We must recognize that such an organizing policy can alone furnish for us the moral atmosphere in which we shall be able to solve the internal problems of our national life. The policy of force and self-interest leads only to destruction.

A statecraft of the sort here described can, however, not be developed by statesmen alone. The entire people must work for it by making an end to the obstacles to conciliation which arise from the insistent assertion of our own rights and our own interests as the continual response to the distrust and criticism of our enemies.

It is our ancient German world-mission which today strikes deep into the German conscience and bids us turn from false idols and a false world policy. To us, the central people of Europe, who by our situation have been forced continually to absorb alien elements and weld these foreign mixtures into a great, com-

prehensive human unity, to us in whose soul there arose in consequence the profound aspiration and joy of mutual understanding and of the friendly adjustment of the respective traits of many peoples, to us it is entrusted as the Central Empire to become the mediator among conflicting traits and interests and traditions and to recognize that in such unifying and moral activity is the only trustworthy protection for our national life. May this realization of our national mission break upon the German people before bitter experience and disappointment teach us, all too harshly, that we have gone astray.

AUSTRIA'S PEACE PROPOSALS

Letter from Emperor Charles to Prince Sixtus¹

(Reprinted from *The New York Times*, April 12, 1918)

PARIS, April 11.—The following official note was issued tonight:

Once caught in the cogwheels of lying, there is no means of stopping. Emperor Charles, under Berlin's eye, is taking on himself the lying denials of Count Czernin, and thus compels the French Government to supply the proof. Herewith is the text of an autograph letter communicated on March 31, 1917, by Prince Sixtus de Bourbon, the Emperor of Austria's brother-in-law, to President Poincaré, and communicated immediately, with the Prince's consent, to the French Premier:

"My Dear Sixtus: The end of the third year of this war, which has brought so much mourning and grief

¹The *Manchester Guardian* for May 8 states that in a second letter to Prince Sixtus, the Austrian Emperor expressed confidence that he could induce Germany to accept peace, provided the territorial demands of the Allies were restricted to Alsace-Lorraine as annexed in 1871. He also professed his readiness to make a separate armistice with the Allies, and stated that Bulgaria stood with Austria-Hungary. Of course, it was to be understood that all occupied territory would be evacuated and Belgian independence and sovereignty unconditionally restored.

The first letter was exposed by M. Clemenceau in the spring of 1918 as a result of Count Czernin's charge that France had been seeking a separate peace with Austria. According to the *London Nation* for June 8, 1918, M. Poincaré gave his word of honor that he would show the letter to nobody but M. Ribot, the French Foreign Minister. It was understood, however, that it would be communi-

into the world, approaches. All the peoples of my empire are more closely united than ever in the common determination to safeguard the integrity of the monarchy at the cost even of the heaviest sacrifices.

"Thanks to their union, with the generous co-operation of all nationalities, my empire and monarchy have succeeded in resisting the gravest assaults for nearly three years. Nobody can question the military advantages secured by my troops, particularly in the Balkans.

"France, on her side, has shown force, resistance, and dashing courage which are magnificent. We all unreservedly admire the admirable bravery, which is traditional to her army, and the spirit of sacrifice of the entire French people.

"Therefore it is a special pleasure to me to note that, although for the moment adversaries, no real divergence of views or aspirations separates many of my cated also to King George and the English premier. In April the substance of the letter was transmitted to Baron Sonnino, the Italian Foreign Minister, but he was not at all disposed to treat. Mr. Balfour, who was in America at the time, knew nothing of the existence of the letters. The only other members of the French Cabinet that were informed of the negotiations were M. Painlevé and M. Albert Thomas. Neither the Belgian nor Russian Governments, nor President Wilson, were notified of the proposals. Such British, French and Italian authorities as were informed agreed that the letters contained no satisfactory basis for peace.

After the letter had been revealed by M. Clemenceau, it became the subject of discussion in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies. Documents relating to the peace proposals from the Austrian Emperor were communicated to the Committee by M. Clemenceau. On the conclusion of its investigations, the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee adopted the following resolution: "After having heard evidence relating to the peace conversations initiated and continued by Austria-Hungary in 1917 and 1918, the Committee is of opinion that these conversations did not provide an opportunity at any time for an acceptable peace for France and her Allies."

empire from France, and that I am justified in hoping that my keen sympathy for France, joined to that which prevails in the whole monarchy, will forever avoid a return of the state of war, for which no responsibility can fall on me.

"With this in mind, and to show in a definite manner the reality of these feelings, I beg you to convey privately and unofficially to President Poincaré that I will support by every means, and by exerting all my personal influence with my allies, France's just claims regarding Alsace-Lorraine.

"Belgium should be entirely re-established in her sovereignty, retaining entirely her African possessions without prejudice to the compensations she should receive for the losses she has undergone.

"Serbia should be re-established in her sovereignty and, as a pledge of our good will, we are ready to assure her equitable natural access to the Adriatic, and also wide economic concessions in Austria-Hungary. On her side, we will demand, as primordial and essential conditions, that Serbia cease in the future all relation with, and suppress every association or group whose political object aims at the disintegration of the monarchy, particularly the Serbian political society, Narodni Ochrana; that Serbia loyally and by every means in her power prevent any kind of political agitation, either in Serbia or beyond her frontiers, in the foregoing direction, and give assurances thereof under the guarantee of the Entente Powers.

"The events in Russia compel me to reserve my ideas with regard to that country until a legal definite Government is established there.

"Having thus laid my ideas clearly before you, I would ask you in turn, after consulting with these

two powers, to lay before me the opinion first of France and England, with a view thus to preparing the ground for an understanding on the basis of which official preliminary negotiations could be taken up and reach a result satisfactory to all.

"Hoping that thus we will soon be able together to put a limit to the sufferings of so many millions of men and families now plunged in sadness and anxiety, I beg to assure you of my warmest and most brotherly affection.

"CHARLES."

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

- Nos. 1-109 (April, 1907, to August, 1916). Including papers by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, George Trumbull Ladd, Elihu Root, Barrett Wendell, Charles E. Jefferson, Seth Low, John Bassett Moore, William James, Andrew Carnegie, Pope Pius X, Heinrich Lammasch, Norman Angell, Charles W. Eliot, Sir Oliver Lodge, Lord Haldane, Alfred H. Fried, James Bryce, and others; also, a series of official documents dealing with the European War. A list of titles and authors will be sent on application.
110. Official Documents Looking Toward Peace. Series I. January, 1917.
 111. Official Documents Looking Toward Peace. Series II. February, 1917.
 112. What Is a Nationality? Part II of The Principle of Nationality, by Theodore Ruysen. March, 1917.
 113. The Bases of an Enduring Peace, by Franklin H. Giddings. April, 1917.
 114. Documents Regarding the European War. Series No. XV.
The Entry of the United States. May, 1917.
 115. The War and the Colleges, from an Address to Representatives of Colleges and Universities, delivered by the Hon. Newton D. Baker, May 5, 1917. June, 1917.
 116. The Treaty Rights of Aliens, by William Howard Taft. July, 1917.
 117. The Effect of Democracy on International Law, by Elihu Root. August, 1917.
 118. The Problem of Nationality. Part III of The Principle of Nationality, by Theodore Ruysen. September, 1917.
 119. Official Documents Looking Toward Peace, Series III. October, 1917.
 120. The United States and Great Britain, by Walter H. Page. The British Commonwealth of Nations, by Lieutenant-General J. C. Smuts. America and Freedom, by Viscount Grey. November, 1917.
 121. The Conference on the Foreign Relations of the United States, held at Long Beach, N. Y., May 28-June 1, 1917. An Experiment in Education, by Stephen Pierce Duggan. December, 1917.
 122. The Aims of the War: Letter of Lord Lansdowne to the London *Daily Telegraph*, November 29, 1917. Reply by Cosmos printed in the *New York Times*, December 1, 1917. The President's Address to the Congress, December 4, 1917. January, 1918.
 123. Victory or Defeat: No Half-way House, speech delivered by the Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George, December 14, 1917; British Labor's War Aims, statement adopted at the Special National Labor Conference at Central Hall, Westminster, December 28, 1917; Great Britain's War Aims, speech delivered by the Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George at the Trade Union Conference on Man Power, January 5, 1918; Labor's After-War Economic Policy, by the Rt. Hon. Arthur Henderson, M.P.; America's Terms of Settlement, address by President Wilson to the Congress, January 8, 1918. British Labor Party's Address to the Russian People, January 15, 1918. February, 1918.
 124. The United States and Japan: text of the Root-Takahira Understanding of November 30, 1908, and of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of Novem-

- ber 3, 1917; Japan and the United States, address by the Hon. Elihu Root, October 1, 1917; The Lansing-Ishii Agreement, address by the Hon. James L. Slayden, November 15, 1917; What of Our Fears of Japan? by Kenneth S. Latourette. March, 1918.
125. The Awakening of the German People, by Otfried Nippold. April, 1918.
126. The Anniversary of America's Entry into the War: An address delivered by President Wilson at Baltimore, Maryland, April 6, 1918; an article written for *The Daily Chronicle* of London by Professor Gilbert Murray. May, 1918.
127. The Lichnowsky Memorandum: Introduction and translation by Munroe Smith, German text from the *Berliner Börsen-Courier*, Appendix by Munroe Smith and Henry F. Munro; Reply of Herr von Jagow, June, 1918.
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Is There a Substitute for Force in International Relations? by Suh Hu. Prize essay, International Polity Club Competition, awarded June, 1916.

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